Anticipating meaningful actions in the environment is an essential function of the brain. Such predictive 27 mechanisms originate from the motor system and allow for inferring actions from environmental 28 affordances, the potential to act within a specific environment. Using architecture, we provide a unique 29 perspective to the abiding debate in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy on whether cognition depends on 30 movement or is decoupled from our physical structure. inference that attempts to either minimizing motor trajectory prediction errors by acting, and thus perceiving 65 the unfolding of the predicted movement, or by changing perception itself (6-8). From the standpoint of active 66 inference, motor systems suppress errors through a dynamic interchange of prediction and action. In other 67 words, there are two ways to minimizing prediction errors; one is to adjust predictions to fit the current sensory 68 input, while another is to adapt the unfolding of movement to make predictions come true. It is a unifying 69 perspective on perception and action suggesting that action is both perceived and caused by perception (9).
Architectural transitions thus include the attenuation of an agent's experience through movements and how 100 such movements animate the body through environmental changes. 101 102
Data from neuroscientific experiments addressing this issue might contribute to discussions centered on 103 philosophical questions on how we relate to the world. For long, enactivists have implicated the reciprocal 104 dependency of the living organism, as a self-organized living system, and the embedded body in a world for 105 cognition (26-28). Enactivism is rooted in phenomenology (21, 29), similar to prominent architectural 106 theorists, who put body, action, and cognition central to experience. Active inference closely relates to 107 enactivism, in the sense that we act to perceive, and vice versa. Such a thesis rests on a hierarchical and 108 dynamic model of the world, which temporally dissociates lower sensorimotor inferences from higher 109 motivated goals, as fast and slow, respectively (30). Fast, lower sensorimotor inferences depict processes of 110 affordances, which thereby must be present in early stages of perception. Hierarchical affordance competition 111 (HAC; Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016) takes the temporal aspect of affordances much further, by suggesting that 112 cortical activity relates to the immediate decision of action selection, which occurs fluently during movement.
113
Such an account of temporally extended affordance is in accordance with active inferences. 114 115
To investigate the impact of environmental affordances on early sensory processing in actively transiting 116 humans, we used a Mobile Brain/Body Imaging approach (32-34) recording brain activity with EEG 117 synchronized to movement recordings and head mounted virtual reality (VR). This approach allows for 118 investigating brain dynamics of participants perceiving an environment and the transitions contained therein 119 as well as brain dynamics during the transitions itself. Previous studies investigating event-related potential 120 (ERP) activity in stationary participants demonstrated slow cortical potentials to indicate anticipative motor 121 behavior (for an overview, see Luck and Kappenman, 2011, chap. 8) . Known motor-related cortical 122 components (MRCPs) are the readiness potential (RP; Kornhuber and Deecke, 2016), contingent negative 123 variation (CNV), and the stimulus-preceding negativity (SPN; Brunia, 2003) , which can be seen as indicators 124 of predictive behavior (38). MRCPs are negative going waveforms preceding an actual, or imagined, motor 125 execution. However, these negative components are associated with multiple processes including sensory, 126 cognitive, and motor systems. In a study by Bozzacchi et al. (39) , the authors attempted to measure affordances 127 of a physical object by evaluating whether the anticipated consequence of action itself influence the brain 128 activity preceding a self-paced action. The authors compared MRCPs of situations where it was possible to 129 reach out and grasp a cup, versus situations where it was impossible to grasp the cup, by tying the hands of the 130 participants. A motor execution was forced at all times. In situations where it was impossible to grasp the cup, 131 the authors reported an absence of early activity over the parietal cortex, and found instead increased activity 132 over the prefrontal cortex. The results were interpreted as reflecting an awareness of the inability to execute a 133 goal-oriented action. Closely related to the MRCPs is the post-imperative negative variation (PINV), a negative 134 going waveform that is present succeeding an imperative stimulus. It reflects the immediate motor execution 135 related to the onset of an imperative stimulus and was observed during experiments investigating learned 136 helplessness or loss of control (40, 41). The PINV thus allows linking of motor related potentials to anticipation 137 of affective states (42).
139
If an enactive account of perception, action and cognition is correct, affordances intimately relate to higher 140 hierarchical levels through low-level perceptual cues. Such an account would situate processing of affordances 141 at a similar stage as early perceptual processes and should reveal differences in sensory and motor-related 142
ERPs associated with the perceived affordance of an environment. To investigate whether brain activity is 143 altered depending on affordances offered by the environment, we presented human observers with 144 environmental stimuli that allowed or prohibited a transition from one room to the next. To this end, 145 participants were presented with a view into a room containing one door of different widths, allowing or 146 prohibiting a transition into the next room and thus providing different affordances. We expected to find 147 differences in cortical responses to co-vary as a function of affordances over sensory and motor areas. In 148 addition, we expected differences in motor-related cortical potentials as a function of the environmental 149 affordances when participants were instructed to walk through the door or to remain in the same room.
Participants. 20 participants (9 female) without history of neurological pathologies were recruited from a 153 participant pool of the Technical University of Berlin, Berlin. All participants read and signed a written 154 informed consent about the experimental protocol, which was approved by the local ethics committee.
155
Participants received either monetary compensation (10€/hour) or accredited course hours. The mean age 156 was 28.1 years (σ = 6.2), all participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and none had a specific 157 background in architecture (no architects or architectural students). One participant was excluded due to 158 technical issues of the experimental setup. 159 160
Paradigm description. The experiment took place in the Berlin Mobile Brain/Body Imaging Laboratories 161 (BeMoBIL) with one of the experimental rooms providing a space of 160 m 2 . The size of the virtual space 162
was 9 x 5 meters with a room size of 4.5 x 5 meters for the first room and a room size of 4.5 x 5 meters for 163 the second room. Participants performed a forewarned (S1-S2) Go/NoGo paradigm (pseudo-randomized 164 50/50) in the virtual reality environment that required them to walk from one room to a second room. Doors 165 of different width ranging from unpassable (20 cm, Narrow) to passable (100 cm, Mid) to easily passible 166 (1500 cm, Wide) manipulated the transition affordance between rooms. The experiment consisted of a 3 x 2 167 repeated measures design including the factors door width (Narrow, Mid, Wide; pseudo-randomized) and 168 movement instruction (Go, NoGo). A total of 240 trials per participant was collected with 40 trials for each 169 of the factor levels. One trial consisted of a participant starting in a dark environment on a predefined starting 170 square (see Figure 1) . The "lights" would go on after a random inter-trial-interval (mean = 3 s, σ = 1 s), and 171 participants faced a room with a closed door. They were instructed to wait (mean = 6 s, σ = 1 s) for a color 172 change of the door with a change to green indicating a Go trial and a change to red indicating a NoGo trial.
173
In case of a green door, the participant walked towards the door, which would slide aside. Upon entering the 174 subsequent space, participants were instructed to find and virtually touch a red rotating circle by using the 175 controller. The circle would inform the participant to have earned another 0.1€ to their basic reimbursement 176 of 10 Euro per hour. After each trial, participants had to give an emotional rating for the environment 177 irrespective of whether they transitioned through the door (Go condition) or whether they remained in the 178 same room (NoGo condition) without transition. To this end, participants were instructed to go back to the 179 starting square, and fill in a virtual Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) questionnaire, using a laser pointer 180 from the controller, and to subsequently pulling the response button located at the pointer finger to turn the 181 "lights off". The lights would go back on automatically to start the next trial. 182 183
In Go-trials, participants were instructed to walk towards the door and into the second room even in case the 184 door was too narrow to pass. This was done to control for motor execution in the Go-condition and to allow 185 movement towards the goal irrespective of the affordance (passable vs. unpassable). Upon touching the 186 surrounding walls, the walls would turn red and inform the participants they have failed to pass, and thus must 187 return to the start square, fill in the virtual SAM and start the next trial by pulling the trigger. Participants 188 would quickly notice that the narrow door (20 cm) was impossible to pass without producing the warning 189 feedback that they have failed to pass. All participants had a training phase to get accustomed to the VR 190 environment and the different conditions. The experimenter observed the participants from a control room, 191 separated from the experimental space, using two cameras and a mirrored display of the virtual environment 192 to reduce interactions to a minimum during the experiments. Figure 2) . Events for recordings of performance and physiological data 215 were triggered by the position of the participant in the tracking space or by the respective response buttons of 216 the remote control. Specific events, such as touching the wall, all button presses, transitioning through the 217 door, answering the questionnaire and all cases of "lights on" (and off), were synchronized with the recorded 218 brain activity and the presented VR environment through LSL. 219 220 EEG data was acquired continuously with a 64 channels EEG system (eegoSports, ANT Neuro, Enschede, 223 Netherlands), sampled with 500 Hz. Impedances were kept below 10 kOhm. The computational delay 224 generated by the interaction of ANT Neuro software, Windows Mixed Reality and Unity was measured to be 225 20 ms (σ = 4), which was taken into account during the analysis by subtracting the average delay from each 226 event latency. With a jitter of 4 ms, we considered the delay to have little to no impact on the ERPs. Offline 227 analysis were conducted using MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA) and the EEGLAB toolbox (46).
228
The raw data were band-pass filtered between 1 Hz and 100 Hz and down-sampled to 250 Hz. Channels with 229 more than five standard deviations from the joint probability of the recorded electrodes were removed and 230 subsequently interpolated. The datasets were then re-referenced to an average reference and adaptive mixture 231 independent component analysis (AMICA; Palmer et al., 2011) was computed on the remaining rank of the 232 data using one model with online artifact rejection in five iterations. The resultant ICA spheres and weights 233 matrices were transferred to the raw dataset that was preprocessed using the identical preprocessing parameters 234 like the ICA dataset, except the filtering, which used a band-pass filter from 0.2 Hz to 40 Hz. Subsequently, 235 independent components (ICs) reflecting eye movements (blinks and horizontal movements) were removed 236 manually based on their topography, their spectrum, and their temporal characteristics. 237
238
Epochs were created time-locked to the onset of the room including the closed door ("Lights on") from -500 239 ms before to 1500 ms after stimulus onset for Narrow, Mid and Wide door trials. Similarly, another set of 240 epochs were time-locked to the second stimulus Go/NoGo from -500 ms before to 1000 ms after onset of the 241 stimulus for Narrow, Mid and Wide door trials. On average, 15% (σ = 10.8) of all epochs were automatically 242 rejected when they deviated more than five standard deviations from the joint probability and distribution of 243 the activity of all recorded electrodes. 244 245
The visual-evoked potentials as well as MRCPs were analyzed at central midline electrodes (Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz, 246
POz and Oz) covering all relevant locations including the visual and the motor cortex as reported in previous 247 studies (39, 48). As stimuli were distributed across the complete visual field and participants walked through 248 the virtual spaces, we did not expect any lateralization of ERPs. All channels were analyzed, however only 249 three channels (FCz, Pz and Oz) are reported and discussed in-text according to reported results by Bozzacchi 250 et al. (39) . The analysis results of all six channels can be found in the supplementary material. For peak analysis 251 of the P1-N1 complex, the grand average peaks were estimated and individual peaks were defined as the 252 maximum positive and negative peak in the time window surrounding the grand average P1 and N1 peak (+/-253 10 ms from peak), respectively. An automatic peak detection algorithm detected the peaks in the averaged 254 epochs for each participant. Multiple peaks were detected and systematically weighed depending on the 255 magnitude, the distance to the grand-average peak latency that was determined by visual inspection of grand 256 average ERP, and the polarity (please see algorithm in the supplementary material). For anterior N1 and 257 posterior P1, by visual inspection of the grand average ERPs, the grand-average latency was estimated to be 258 140 ms with a search window for individual peaks ranging from 50 -200 ms. For the anterior P1 and posterior 259 N1 the grand-average peak latency was estimated to 215 ms with a search window for individual peaks ranging 260 from 140 -290 ms.
262
Mean peak amplitudes were analyzed using a 3 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA using the door width (Narrow, PINV. In the preparation time prior to the onset of the door color change, indicating either to walk through the 361 door or to remain in the same room, we observed no systematic negative going waveform as reported in 362 previous studies (37, 49). However, after onset of the color change, a pronounced positivity, followed by a 363 long-lasting negative waveform over fronto-central locations was observed in the ERP (Figure 7 .1 and see 364 Figure 7 .2 in supplementary material for full six channels). This negative waveform resembled a post-365 imperative negative variation (PINV) as described in previous studies (40, 42, 50 Post-hoc contrasts, using Tukey HSD, revealed significant differences only for the Go condition, as opposed 376 to the NoGo condition (Figure 8.1 Early evoked potentials. As an initial insight into the association of affordances and cortical potentials, we 428 analyzed the early visual-evoked potentials. We expected to find differences in the stimulus-locked ERP at 429 occipital channels reflecting differences in sensory processing of affordance-related aspects of the transition. 430
Importantly, based on the assumption of fast sensorimotor active inferences that should be reflected in 431 action-directed stimulus processing influencing not only sensory but also motor-related activity, we 432 hypothesized to also find differences in the ERP over motor areas in the same time window as sensory 433 potentials (i.e., between 50 and 200 ms). As illustrated in the analysis, we found significant differences in 434 amplitudes of the visually evoked P1 component over the central occipital electrode dependent on the 435 affordance of the transition. In addition, in line with our hypothesis, we also found a difference over fronto-436 central leads starting around 50 ms and lasting until 200 ms after onset of the doors display. Taken together, 437 no significant differences in peak amplitudes were found when comparing the passable Mid and Wide doors 438 while peak amplitude associated with both door widths significantly differed from impassable Narrow doors.
439
Note that the visual scene of the three doors are comparable as they contained same physical contrasts, and 440 that participants at this point did not know whether to go or not as they were merely introduced to the setting 441 they might have to pass in a couple of seconds. As no significant differences were found for NoGo, it 442 functions as a matching control, and thus we can interpret the differences in Go as affordance manipulation.
443
These results indicate that impassable doors with poor affordances produce significantly different early 444 evoked potentials compared to passable doors particularly at fronto-central and occipital sites. Thus, 445 environmental affordances, in terms of being able to program bodily trajectory to transit spaces, yield a 446 significant measurable effect on early cortical potentials best pronounced over frontal and occipital sites at 447 approximately 200ms after first view of the environment. 448 449
Considering the affordance-specific pattern observed for the early P1-N1-complex, prior studies have shown 450 this visual evoked potential complex to reflect attentional processes associated with spatial or feature-based 451 aspects of stimuli (53-57). Attended stimuli elicit larger P1-N1 amplitudes than unattended ones. Based on 452 these findings, the results suggest that passable transitions were associated with increased attentional 453 processing. Approaching the affordance-specific pattern of P1-N1-complex using active inferences (58), the 454 difference confirms the assumption that perceptual processes co-vary with environmental affordances. In this 455 sense, the amplitude difference might be credited to the process of active inference of whether the body can 456 actively move and transit at all. This implies that visual attention is also guided by action-related properties of 457 the environment and support the concept of fast, lower sensorimotor active inferences, explained as 458 hierarchical and dynamic model of the world. Similar to HAC (31) and active inference (30, 59), these findings 459 are in line with parallel cortical processes integrating sensory information to specify currently available 460 affordances. Similarly, this means that, how one might act upon the environment is an ongoing process of 461 affordances, taking place as early as perceptual processes, and which situates actions in an intimate position 462 with perception. Such early processes are deeply involved in the impression of the environment for an agent 463 pointing towards the importance of movement in cognition, and of how an agent enacts the world. Given 464 affordances are processed at such an early stage, we speculate whether the impression of an environment 465 compose the immediate experience of the environment in a particular setting. Such an immediate experience 466 fits with the term atmospheres as defined by Zumthor (60) "I enter a building, see a room, and -in a fraction 467 of a second -have this feeling about it", and thus relating the instantaneous emerging experience of space to 468 affordances and action in general.
470
Motor-related potentials. Although the ERP plots indicate an affordance-trend of the EPIC, statistical tests 471 revealed no significant differences. However, Narrow door width elicited the greatest amplitude, both in case 472 of anterior positivity and posterior negativity. In line with prediction errors and affordances, the increased 473 amplitude associated with Narrow transitions can be interpret as a reflection of the body simply not fitting, 474
and yet forced to interact with the transition. Recall that prior to the imperative stimulus, participants have 475 been standing for 6 s (σ = 1 s). The EPIC may have an influence on the PINV. influence; depriving the potential to act. This could explain the difference in the Narrow condition, as 488 participants were instructed to attempt to pass at all times until failure leading to a sense of loss of control.
489
Only in cases of Go did we observe a difference in the PINV component, which varied similar to the P1-N1-490 complex. Amplitudes of the component for Narrow doors were significantly different from Mid and Wide 491 doors, while the passable conditions did not differ from one another. Further, there were no significant 492 differences in the PINV component in cases of NoGo, emphasizing the importance of the motor execution 493 itself to evoke the PINV component. These results point towards the PINV component as an expression of 494 willingness to execute an act restricted beyond ones' own control, i.e. a designed environment. Thus, the PINV 495 might serve as an excellent marker for affordances. 496
The presented results of the PINV are consistent with the observed increase in activity over fronto-central sites 497
by Bozzacchi et al. (39) . Bozzacchi and colleagues concluded that the meaning of the action and awareness of 498 being able to act -affordances -affect action preparation, which is here understood as the motor-related 499 potential prior to movement onset. We argue that the PINV component might reflect a willingness, or even 500 intentional, aspect of affordances. This would mean that the PINV is not modulated by the perception (that the 501 door is a different visual information), but reveals something about the intention of movement -which we 502 translate to affordances. For this reason, we find significant differences in cases of Go, but not in NoGo, and 503 further for passable compared to impassable. In light of HAC (31), a potential explanation for the absence of 504 differences in the NoGo trials, is related to the immediate action selection, which in all cases (Narrow, Mid 505
and Wide) is a simple turn to answer the questionnaire, and thus present the participant with identical 506 affordances. When instead given a Go, cortical processes require an action selection related to the anticipated 507 motor trajectory, which differs according to the affordances of the door width. Regarding the temporal aspect 508 of transitioning to the next room, HAC suggests the higher levels bias the lower level competitions, which 509 operate at the level of action itself, through a cascade of expected next affordances. The lower levels have a 510 continuous competition of how to satisfy the higher expectations. Action selection, executed while unfolding 511 the planned movements in a continuous manner, depend on the expectation of next affordances. Taken 512 together, the post-hoc analyses revealed differences grouped for passable as compared to impassable doors 513 throughout all channels, except for Pz. We do not observe any differences between Mid-Wide, but find 514 significant differences between Narrow-Mid and Narrow-Wide. The greatest differences were found over 515 fronto-central and occipital sites. Similar to the early evoked potentials, these results indicate that 516 environmental affordances impact neural activity prior to action depending on whether one has to act or not. 517 518
Notably, regarding architectural experience, since the PINV component was only expressed in the Go 519 condition (forced interaction with the environment), these findings support the importance of movement for 520 architectural experience, in a sense that action or even only the perception of action possibilities alters brain 521 activity. Visually guiding and propelling the body in space greatly influences the continuous emerging of 522 affordances, which in turn affect the human experience. We found differences in fronto-central and occipital 523 areas, prior to movement through space with the post-imperative negative going waveform most pronounced 524
over FCz indicated an involvement of the supplementary motor area (SMA) as reported by Bozzacchi et al.
525
(39). Interestingly, earlier studies showed involvement of SMA in visually guided actions (65), which is the 526 essence of active inferences. The PINV can be generated independently from the re-afferent signal, which is, 527 in terms of active inference, understood as ascending (bottom-up) proprioceptive prediction-errors (66). This 528 suggests the PINV component might reflect descending (top-down) predictions, rendering SMA as an essential 529 area of action-perception loop, and thus crucial for processing continuous affordances. This account might 530 resolve the finding of fronto-central differences in Go trials only. The SMA is anatomically bridging the frontal 531 cortex with motor cortex -perhaps also functionally as argued by Adams et al. (66) , as this anatomical nature 532 fits with the proposed hierarchical characteristics of forward and backward projections in active inferences. 533 534
CONCLUSION

535
The present study provides strong evidence for affordances to be processed as early as perceptual processes, 536 linking action and perception in a similar manner to active inference. The results points towards a conception 537 of the brain that seems to deal with "how can I act" while in parallel processes referring to "what do I perceive" 538 take place. The results thus support the assumption that perception of the environment is influenced by 539 affordances and action itself -hence, affordances and action can influence experience of an environment. Due 540 to the importance of affordances and action for brain dynamics, this further emphasizes and qualifies the 541 general idea of enactivism as a holistic approach to investigate cognition. We do not claim that architectural 542 affordances are directly represented as a specific event-related potential component; however, we provide 543 evidence for an action-perception account of cognition, which systematically differentiates according to the 544 definition of affordances. 545
The nature of the analyzed brain activity emphasizes the importance of the intentional movement. Our results 546 are consistent with the concept of continuous affordances as explained by active inferences. In terms of 547 architecture, the results shed light on why transitions have been a constant throughout the history of 548 architecture, perhaps especially in religious and other buildings that actively aimed at producing a certain 549 experience of presence. Thus, the fact that we are predictive beings, in terms of architecture, means we should 550 take into consideration how bodily movement alters perception. By altering perception, this would ultimately 551 lead spaces to have a potentially physiological impact on users. Much remains to be uncovered in architectural 552
cognition. Moving and transitioning in space, is continuously constructing a prediction of a world, a world that 553 we perceive dependent on our action potentials, which informs brain, body and mind. 
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NoGo conditions, and observed only significant differences for Go condition. We observed differences within frontocentral and 876 occipital sites. 
